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to say that &dquo;Weber, Freud, Durkheim,
and Croce succumbed to a psychological
malaise&dquo; because they acknowledged
&dquo;irrational forces underlying even the
most rational behaviour and institu-
tions ?&dquo; And there are errors of fact.
The &dquo;Economic Circle&dquo; did not lead
to &dquo;the founding of the Fabian Society&dquo;
though it had some influence on
Fabianism. Moreover, Ms. Soffer’s treat-
ment of social thought is, like so much
of her subject matter, rather insular. The
absence of any reference to Parson’s
classic study, in which Marshall is
treated along with Pareto, Durkheim
and Weber, is indicative. So too is the
absence of any reference to Marx. In-
deed, from a broader framework one
might question the usefulness of her dis-
tinction between &dquo;revolutionaries&dquo; and
&dquo;revisionists.&dquo; Marshall, James, and
Wallas after all remained firmly wedded
to the essentially individualistic com-
mitments of their liberal predecessors.
McDougall and Trotter, in contrast,
made the fundamental methodological
shift which Durkheim had made earlier-
to the &dquo;social fact&dquo; or society as a reality
sui generis as the main object of in-
vestigation. From a European perspec-
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This extended essay about relation-
ships between the United States and
Western Europe in the period since
World War II concentrates primarily on
security and military strategy issues,
and especially on the problem of se-
curity of Western Europe vis-A-vis the
Soviet Union. The North Atlantic Treaty
figures prominently in the analysis. Al-
though the broad outline of the book
follows a chronological sequence, it is
not a history and within chapters events
are treated topically rather than chrono-
logically. At least half of the book deals
with the 1960s. Great attention is given
to the disagreements, controversies, and
conflicts among the NATO members.
The final chapter of the book calls for a
new institutional relationship between
the United States and the members of
the European Economic Community,
and it expresses the hope that Japan
could be brought into this arrangement.
The author adjures that the &dquo;super-
super power&dquo; thus created could &dquo;en-
sure peace for a generation or more&dquo;
(p. 365).
Unfortunately the prescription for the
new institutional relationship between
the United States and Western Europe
is not very detailed. It is asserted that
Europe must be an equal partner to the
United States, and that European leader-
ship is vitally needed. Both points are
persuasive, but the real issues concern
the details of implementing these sug-
gestions, not the broad goals. The real
issues involve bringing several key
European polities together for the pur-
suit of coordinated or joint policies. One
cannot recommend how to do this with-
out examining issues that have tradi-
tionally been considered domestic rather
than international.
There is little analysis of such issues
in this book, and what analysis there is
is confined largely to the United States
and the United Kingdom. There is even
little analysis of such matters as the suc-
cesses and failures of the Eurogroup
within NATO, and of the difficulties that
have arisen in connection with the co-
ordinated or joint production of arma-
ments for NATO forces. A detailed anal-
ysis of these matters might have re-
sulted in a better understanding of the
difficulties that stand in the way of craft-
ing a new relationship between Western
Europe and the United States, and of-
fered new insights concerning ways
in which these difficulties might be
overcome.
The book is more an account of major
controversies than a detailed study of
any particular aspect of the Atlantic
partnership. These controversies are
presented clearly and fairly, although
the author’s disdain for certain positions
taken by various British and French of-
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ficials is evident. It is regretable and
annoying that the account is marred by
several minor inaccuracies and errors.
HAROLD K. JACOBSON
The University of Michigan
Ann Arbor
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In 1959 Herbert Wechsler rekindled
the long-standing debate regarding the
need for principled decisions in consti-
tutional interpretation. To Wechsler-
and to many others before, such as James s
Bradley Thayer in the nineteenth century
-the limits of the judicial function are
prescribed by the logic and language of ,
law itself. For judges to go beyond
such externally imposed limits leads to
an adulteration of the judicial process.
But can the outcomes of difficult consti-
tutional cases rest solely upon the logic,
consistency, and general principles of
law? Of course not. To try to under-
stand-and then to cast into intelligible
language-the nature of the judicial
function has been the mission of many.
Few have succeeded. Benjamin Car-
dozo, Felix Frankfurter, and Glendon
Schubert (each in his own diverse
way) have. Howard Ball has not.
Ball has attempted to create an opera-
tional definition of judicial craftsman-
ship using Wechsler’s notion of a prin-
cipled decision. In order to exhibit
such craftsmanship, the United States
Supreme Court, in reversing itself, must
decide &dquo;in a principled manner.&dquo; Ball
goes on: the &dquo;thesis posited is that
when the Court overturns, it must base
its stance on one of three justifications:
rightness, factual correctness, and con-
stitutional principles&dquo; (p. xiii). The ab-
sence of craftsmanship is decision
by fiat.
Undaunted by the overwhelming prob-
lems (which eventually ensnare the
author himself) of trying to operationalize
rightness, factual correctness, and extant
general principles, Ball produces a
chapter each on three Supreme Court
reversals of the twentieth century. He
examines: United States v. Darby Lum-
ber Co. (1941) (overturning Hammer v.
Dagenhart); West Virginia Board of
Education v. Barnette (1943) (overturn-
ing Minersville v. Gobitis; and Hudgens
v. National Labor Relations Board (1976)
(overturning Amalgamated Food Em-
ployees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza).
His conclusions are that both Darby
and Barnette (the Second Flag Salute
Case) are good examples of judicial
craftsmanship because they right the
errors of anachronistic precedents. That
Minersville was an anachronism is not
so clear cut, Ball seems to tell us, be-
cause of the complicating factors of ex-
ternal political conditions (the coming of
World War II) and Mr. Justice Frank-
furter’s call for judicial restraint. Hudg-
ens is a decision by &dquo;judicial fiat&dquo; in
large measure because Ball regards
Logan Valley Plaza as correctly decided,
for the latter &dquo;took cognizance of chang-
ing economic and social conditions and
began to develop the law in light of these
realities&dquo; (p. 133).
By the conclusion of the three &dquo;case
studies,&dquo; one can only agree with the im-
plicit thesis embedded in the analysis:
it is indeed necessary to go beyond the
general principles woven into constitu-
tional law in order adequately to under-
stand the judicial process. That Ball so
steadfastly refuses to recognize (as con-
temporary political scientists almost
universally do) the importance of such
factors as changed Court personnel, jus-
tices’ ideologies and role definitions,
and collegial or group decisionmaking,
in explaining the judicial process will, if
nothing else, surprise his readers.
There are other surprises. Noted con-
stitutional scholars Alpheus T. Mason
and Walter F. Murphy became Arthur
T. Mason and William Murphy in
bibliographic citations.
ROBERT G. SEDDIG
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